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Bananas, Airplanes and the WTO: Prohibited Export Subsidies
Marc Kleiner*
Few topics in international law have created as much
controversy as the problems of export subsidies. There is a shared sense
among the international community that subsidies can divert resources
away from their most efficient or valued use.' Disputes involving export
subsidies and unfair trade practices are premised on the notion that each
party agrees in principle that those types of practices are wrong, but there
is disagreement that the practice it engages in involves an unfair trade
practice or an export subsidy. Part I is an overview and history behind
the creation of the WTO. The role that diplomacy plays and why it was
necessary to create the WTO to resolve disputes involving trade and
subsidies are also explored. Part II addresses the EU Banana Regime and
the current solutions to end the controversy. Part III discuses the EU's
subsidies to Airbus Industre and why the U.S. argues that it violates the
GATT and various agreements. Part IV focuses on the controversy
involving State tax practices that have the effect of being subsidies. The
final section briefly addresses the economic effects of airplane noise
restriction and agricultural subsidies and the impact on world trade.
I. The History Behind the Creation of the WTO
Prior to the 1995 World Trade Organization ("WTO") reform of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") the U.S. policy
on settling disputes involving aspects of trade was the unilateral
application of §301.2 Under §301 of the United States Trade Act of 1974,
the American Executive is authorized to take retaliatory action against
any foreign country that unreasonably, unfairly or illegally has denied
access to American goods or services.3 In many situations such unilateral
action by the U.S. probably violated international law and even the
provisions under GATT.4
Under GATT, the U.S. was required "to engage the foreign
government in formal consultations looking toward settlement of the
* (J.D.) University of Miami School of Law, 2001.
'ALAN C. SwAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 668
(Lexis Publishing 2nd ed. 1999) [hereinafter Swan & Murphy].
2 Alan C. Swan, Unilateralism and the Evolution of International Economic Law
The Saga of §301 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University
of Miami International and Comparative Law Review) [hereinafter Swan].
3 Pub. L No. 93-618, Title I1 §301 et. seq. January 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 2041; 19
U.S.C. § 2411 et. seq.
4 Swan, supra note 2, at 4.
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dispute."5 The problem of such unilateral action was that it caused much
resentment and anger among the U.S.'s trading partners and
consequently had the ability to create animosity with various foreign
governments.6 There were numerous problems with GATT but the most
significant problem was the requirement of a consensus rule for approval
of panel decisions. A party could block the adoption of a ruling through a
veto, which effectively meant that the harmed party could not adopt
remedial measures without being in violation of GAT. 7 The creation of
the WTO as part of the 1994 GATT changed all of that by creating a new
dispute settlement understanding (DSU) and established the dispute
settlement body (DSB). The WTO functions include implementing,
administering and operating the covered agreements as well as providing
the forum for trade negotiations among its members.8 The DSB is
authorized to administer the rules and procedures under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (the "Understanding"). The Understanding
provided for some key fundamental changes in the rules and procedures
of dispute settlement under GATT. Among the many changes, the
Understanding provided for automatic establishment of panels, appellate
review, and limits on unilateral action.9
One of the most significant changes under the DSU is the
creation of a "negative consensus" rule whereby the panel or appellate
body reports were deemed adopted unless rejected by a consensus
decision.10 Since the creation of the WTO the U.S. has not unilaterally
taken any action under §301 and has submitted its disputes through the
DSU process. Diplomacy still plays a significant role in settling trade
disputes. As will be seen in the following sections, it is only after
negotiations between the parties fail to resolve the problem does the
complaining party invoke the mechanisms of the WTO. The WTO is no
substitute for diplomatic attempts at resolutions, but given the past
history, the advent of the WTO has proved to be a significant system for
the neutral resolution of trade conflicts.
HI. Bananas
One of the most prominent disputes over the last few years has
been the Banana controversy. The dispute began in 1993 with the
creation of the European Union's single market. Prior to 1993 several
5 Id. at5.6 Id. at 7.
7 Td. at 14.
8 Zsolt K. Bessko, Going Bananas Over EEC Preferences? A Look at The
Banana Trade War and The WTO's Understanding On Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 265, 287
(1996).
9See id.
10 Swan, supra note 2, at 17.
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European nations had been providing the ex-colonies of Africa, the
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) with preferential access to EU banana
exports, which effectively discriminated against banana imports from
Latin and Central America. "Other European countries allowed
unrestricted trade or instituted other import regimes, resulting in a
patchwork of national policies." 11 The EU felt it needed to adopt a single
banana regime in order to eliminate internal barriers between the EU
member countries. The new regime set up a tariff quota system to
imports from countries other than the ex-colonies, and established import
licenses on preferential terms to former colonies.'2 The EC consumes
about four million tons of bananas annually and is the second largest
importer of bananas after the United States. Domestic EC producers only
supply between 645,000 and 750,000 tons of the four million tons
consumed yearly with the remaining 2.8 million tons coming from a
combination of the ACP and Latin American States. 3 Effectively, once
the European Union Banana Regime was adopted, companies such as
Chiquita suffered declines in profits once the new tariffs and quotas were
put in place.'
4
Initially, the U.S. along with several Central American producers
complained to the GATT regarding the preferential treatment but initial
consultations failed between the EEC and the U.S. The GATT panel
initially held the import restrictions violated certain provisions of the
GATT but the EEC was able to block the adoption of the panel report.1
5
With the creation of the WTO, Chiquita and the Hawaii Banana Industry
Association submitted a §301 petition to the U.S. Trade Representative
in 1995, which allowed the.U.S. to seek formal resolution by the WTO.
16
The U.S. charged that the preferential trading regime violate the Most
Favored Nations (MIFN) principle of GATT Article 1:1, 17 its tariff rate
11 Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Note Bananas, Beef and Compliance in the World
Trade Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to
Achieve Compliance from Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
133,147-48 (2001) [hereinafter Brimeyer].
12Id. at 148.
13 Raj Bhala, The Bananas War, 45 MCGEORGE L. REv. 839, 849 (2000)
[hereinafter Bhala].
14 Office of the United States Trade Representative, The U.S.-EU Banana
Agreement,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/04/faq.pdf (last visited Mar. 6,
2002).
15 Bhala, supra note 13, at 849.
16 Bhala, supra note 13, at 873.
17 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994), World Trade Organization
Legal Texts,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/final-e.htm (last visited
July 20, 2002).
GATT Article 1: 1 states:
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quotas violated GAIT article XII118 and the import licensing regime
violated the MFN principle of GATT Article I:A and the national
treatment principle of GATT Article JI:42
9 20
Ultimately, under the new dispute resolution mechanism the
Europeans were unable to block the WTO panel report finding that the
EU's "banana import regime and its licensing procedures for the
importation of bananas were inconsistent with various obligations of the
GAIT 1994 and related WTO agreements." 21 At first the EC refused to
accept the WTO's initial decision and announced their decision to
appeal. The Appellate Body issued and adopted a report upholding the
panel's decision.22 By 1999 the European Union had amended the banana
import regime; however, the WTO ruled that it failed to conform to the
previous WTO ruling. In retaliation, the WTO authorized the U.S. to
With Respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of article HI, any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destine for the territories of
all other contracting parties.
18 Id. GAIT Article XIII: 1 states in part:
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any
other contracting party or on the exportation of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party, unless
the importation of the like product of all third countries or the
exportation of the like product to all third countries is similarly
prohibited or restricted.
19 Id.
GATT Article H: 4(4) states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of
this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential
internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on
the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the
nationality of the product2 0 Bhala, supra note 13, at 873.
21 Brimeyer, supra note 11, at 149.
2 2 EC- Regime for Importation, Sales and Distribution of Bananas Report of the
Appellate Body WT/DS27/AB/R (September 9, 1997).
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impose 100% duties on selected EU products up to $191.4 million in
trade sanctions as retaliation.23
The EU and the U.S. have recently reached an agreement to
settle the dispute.24 Under the proposed agreement, the EU banana
regime will move to a tariff only system by 2006. During the transition
period bananas will be imported into the EU through import licenses
which will be distributed based on past trade.25 Under the new system the
EC will make adjustments to the quantities in the various quotas in order
to expand access for Latin American Bananas while ensuring a secure
marketplace for specific quantities of ACP bananas.26 On July 1, 2001,
the US announced that it was lifting regulatory duties on $191 million
worth of EU products resulting from the steps taken by the EU to
increase market access for U.S. banana distributors.27 The plan still has
to be approved by the WTO before it is considered GATT compliant.
M. Airplane Subsidies: The Airbus Industry
Controversy
Another area that has caused controversy is the EU subsidies of
the Airbus Industry. "Aircraft represents the largest exporting industry in
the U.S. and Aircraft production affects nearly 80% of the U.S.
Economy., 28 Airbus is a consortium of four European companies that
collectively produce the Airbus aircraft. The governments of France,
Germany, United Kingdom and Spain have, since its inception in 1967,
been providing massive subsidies to their respective member companies
to aid in the development, production and marketing of Airbus civil
aircrafts according to the U.S. Trade Representative.2 9 As a result of
these subsidies, Airbus has been able to claim a 55% market share and
recently surpassed Boeing in sales.30 In recent years, Airbus' A320 and
23 Brimeyer, supra note 11, at 152.
24 U.S. Government and European Commission Reach Agreement To Resolve
Long Standing Banana Dispute, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/04/01-23.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
2 Id.
26 Td.
27 Richard Mills, U.S. Trade Representative Announces the Lifting of Sanctions
on European Products as EU Opens Market to U.S. Banana Distributors,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/releasesl200l/07/01-50.pdf (last visited Feb.
17, 2002).
28 Michael J. Levick, The Production of Civil Aircraft: A Compromise of Two
World Giants, 21 TRANSP. L.J. 434 (1993) [hereinafter Levick].
29 Staff of the United States Trade Representative, 2001 Report European Union
Section,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/html//2001_eu.pff (last visited February 17,
2002) [hereinafter Trade Report].
30 Scott Hamilton, The Real Boeing Story; Mortgaging the Future, SEATTLE
TIMES (Mar.28,2001),
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A330 models have been outselling Boeing's 737 and 767 models.31 U.S.
Officials estimate that Airbus has received over $30 Billion in subsidies
since it's inception, and most recently the European governments have
agreed to provide $4 billion in loans to help cover the cost of developing
the A380 super jumbo jet to compete with Boeings' 747S.32
There are a number of agreements that have to be examined to
understand the nature of the dispute between the US and EU and their
interpretations as to whether aircraft subsidies are permissible. The
GATT itself, the GATT Subsidies Code, The U.S.-EU Bilateral
Agreement on Large Civil Aircraft and the Multilateral Agreement on
Large Civil Aircraft.
The relevant GATT provision on the subject of subsidies is
Article XVI. While Article XVI by itself does not outlaw subsidies, it
must be read in conjunction with Articles XXIII, which states that
"remedies are available whenever "benefits" accruing to one party under
the GATT are being "nullified or impaired" by the action of another
party." 33 In addition, Articles XVI, VI:3, and 6 must be considered.
Overall, while not strictly prohibited, subsides under the GATT are
available even when those actions would not be considered illegal under
the GATT. 4 For the most part, the GATT provisions are fairly sparse
and poorly define subsidies and what is considered an illegal subsidy.
Acknowledging the deficiencies of the GATT's treatment of
subsidies, one of the important aspects that came out of the Uruguay
Round was the WTO Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measure (Subsidies Code).35
Under article I of the Subsidies Code, a subsidy exists if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any
public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this
Agreement as "government"), i.e. where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g.
grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or
liabilities(e.g.loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not
collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits);
available at http://www.archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-
bin/texis/web/vortex (last visited July 20, 2002).31 id.
32 Les Blumenthal, U.S. Issues Warning Over Airbus, NEws TRIB., (May 1,
2001) [hereinafter Blumenthal].
33 SwAN & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 671.
34 id.
351 Id. at 672.
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(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general
infrastructure, or purchases goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or
entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of
functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested
in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from
practices normally followed by governments;or[;]
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense
of ArticleXVI of GATT 1994; and (b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
3 6
The GATT Civil Aircraft Agreement (CAA) signed in 1986 was
designed to address particular issues to trade in civil aircraft; however,
the agreement only incorporates by reference the subsidies provisions of
the GATT. The new aircraft code created new rules regarding marketing,
but fails to provide any restrictions on the use of government export
credits. 37 Ultimately the CAA did little to improve upon the Subsidies
code.
38
In 1987, the U.S. challenged a German program that insulated
Deutsche Airbus against adverse exchange rate fluctuations. "[The]
GATT dispute panel ruled that the German program was in breach of the
subsidies code because it was an export subsidy covered by the Annex to
the 1979 Subsidies Code, subsection 'j', which prohibits certain
exchange rate insurance programs. 3 9 The EC exercised their right under
the 1947 GATT to block the ruling, which prevented the U.S. from
taking any remedial measures in this case. Realizing the deficiencies of
the GAT and the subsidies code, the U.S. and the EC attempted to
negotiate a bilateral treaty that would reduce the role of government
support of the airline industry.
40
In 1992, after years of negotiation, the EU and U.S. entered into
Bilateral Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft. After the German
Exchange Rate case, the EC realized that the Airbus subsidies programs
violated international law and in the future they would be in the
uncomfortable position of having to block future actions under the
Subsidies code.4 1 In an effort to thwart the U.S. from pursuing its claim
36 Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods Agreement On Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, April 15, 1994 Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (on file with the author).37 Levick , supra note 28, at 450-51.
38 Richard 0 Cunningham, Subsidies to Large Civil Aircraft Production: New
WTO Subsidy Rules and Dispute Settlement Mechanism Alter Dynamics of US.-
E. U. Dispute, 14 FALL AIR & SPACE LAW. 4 (1999) [hereinafter Cunningham].
39 Shane Spradlin, The Aircraft Subsidies Dispute in the GAYT's Uruguay
Round, 60 J. AIRL. & CoM. 1191, 1206 (1995) [hereinafter Spradlin].40 d. at 1208.
411d.
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in the GATT, the EC hastened to enter into a bilateral agreement with the
U.S. to resolve their dispute.
42
Under the agreement, Europeans committed to four important
points. First, they agreed to reduce support levels. Secondly, they agreed
to provide no support other than new aircraft program development
supports. Thirdly, they agreed to limit such development subsidies to
33% of a program's total development cost and to provide development
supports only to programs justified by a critical project appraisal. Lastly,
indirect government aid was to be limited to 3% of the annual industry
wide turnover and 4% of the turnover for each individual manufacturer. 43
The agreement does not preclude either party from taking subsidy issues
to WTO dispute resolutions if either party violates the terms of the
agreement.44
From the outset, the U.S. position has been that Europe's
subsidies to Airbus are improper. The U.S. has long argued that the
direct government contracts for commercial airlines, loan and loan
guarantees that cover both the development and production costs,
guarantees against loses due to exchange rate fluctuations, tax breaks,
debt forgiveness and bailouts are all violations of the GATT and SCM
agreements to which the EU and U.S. are parties to.
45
The European response to the U.S. Claims is that subsidies of the
Airbus Industry is legal under the bilateral agreement because the
support for Airbus falls below 33% as provided for in that agreement.46
In addition, the EC claims that the U.S. has long been supporting Boeing
and the U.S. Aircraft industry through government support in research,
development and large military contracts that has allowed the U.S.
companies to take more risk than they could otherwise assume on their
own. 47 The EU asserts that the indirect support of the U.S. civil aircraft
industry though military spending and NASA research grants provides
the same type of government assistance as the Europeans in a more
indirect manner.48
Currently, this issue is at a stalemate. The U.S. maintains that
EU subsidies of the Airbus Industry must be considered not only under
the bilateral agreement but also under the WTO agreement and its
chapter on subsidies.49 EU takes a much more narrow stance that the
42 Cunningham, supra note 38.
43 Levick, supra note 28, at 452.
44 Spradlin, supra note 39, at 6.
45 Levick, supra note 28, at 436.
46 U.S. Doubts EU assertion Airbus Loans Follow Rules, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr.
24, 2001, at C3 [hereinafter Loans].
47 Levick, supra note 28, at 437.
48 Levick, supra note 28, at 437.
49 Loans, supra note 46.
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bilateral agreement is controlling.50 Whether the parties can reach an
understanding is questionable. The most recent Super 301 report places
this issue on a very closely monitored watch list"' and unless an
agreement is reached the U.S. will likely pursue its cause in the WTO.
IV. Foreign Sales Corporations and the EU Dispute
But in this world nothing is certain but death and taxes.
-Benjamin Franklin
The hardest thing in the world to understand is income tax!
-Albert Einstein
The role of taxes and their relation to subsidies have always been
a source of contention in international trade. Included in the definition of
a subsidy in the Subsidies Code are tax credits. 2 Every country has
different tax laws and the tax treatment on exports has spurred numerous
debates. The U.S. taxes its citizens, including U.S. corporations on both
domestic and foreign sources of income, but reduces international double
taxation by allowing for a foreign tax credit paid on foreign source
income. s Many European countries allow for exemptions from the
value added tax (VAT) for exported goods, which created a tremendous
advantage for European exporters.
In an attempt to address the disadvantage U.S. companies were
faced with, the Nixon administration introduced the Domestic
International Sales Corporation ("DISC") legislation, in an effort to
promote U.S. exports.5 4 DISC's are U.S. corporations whose income is
derived from exports. Under the program, the profits of a DISC were not
taxed to the DISC, but were taxed to the shareholders of the DISC when
distributed or deemed distributed to them. The shareholder could defer
the taxes until the distribution was actually made. 5 The EC objected to
50 EU Commission Tells U.S. the Airbus A380 Subsidies Within Agreed Limits
AFX NEWS, Apr. 23, 2001, available at http://www afx.com (last visited July 20,
2002).
51 Blumenthal, supra note 32.
52 World Trade Agreement (1994) Article :.1 states that a subsidy is deemed to
exist if-
"(ii) government revenue that is otherwise foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal
incentives such as tax credits)," available at http://www.jus.uio.no/Im/wta.1994
/iialal3.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
53 See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International
Commerce, 54 TAxL. REV. 131 (2001) [hereinafter Warren].
54 United States-Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, Report of the
Panel, WT/DS108IR (October 8, 1999) [hereinafter Report] (on file with the
author).55id.
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the introduction of the DISC, and upon their objection the U.S.
responded by requesting that if the DISC was a subsidy, than the income
tax laws of Belgium, France and the Netherlands also resulted in subsidy
as well. 6 The panel found that the European and American practices
were an illegal export subsidy under GATT 1947 Article XVI:4.5 7
At the time the U.S. signed the WTO Subsidies Agreement the
U.S. was committed to bringing their laws into conformity with the
Agreement and thus created the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) to
replace the DISC.58 FSC's are foreign corporations, generally a shell
company of a U.S. corporation that has been established for the purpose
of serving as a vehicle for U.S. exports and reducing the tax implications
by as much as 30%. 59 Under U.S. Law, the foreign source income of a
foreign corporation engaged in trade or business in the United States is
taxable only to the extent that it is "effectively connected with the
conduct of a trade or business within the United States."
In designing the FSC, Congress was attempting to devise a
program that would exempt a portion of the income from foreign
60
economic processes in export transactions. U.S. exporters were able to
price their goods more cheaply and market them more aggressively as a
result of the FSC scheme. 61 By 1999, there were over 6000 FSC's with a
net exempt income of over four billion dollars with manufacturing
products accounting for the vast majority of generated exports.62 Once
again, the EC alleged that the FSC scheme violated U.S. obligations
under GATT and the Subsidies Agreement.63 The panel agreed with the
EC and found that FSC violated Article 3.1(a) of the subsidies
agreement.64 The U.S. unsuccessfully appealed the decision of the panel
in 2000, but the panel made clear that their ruling was not intended to
require a member to choose one kind of tax system to be consistent with
their WTO obligations. 65
The current status of tax incentive programs is problematic. In
May 2000, the U.S. presented a replacement regime for the FSC to bring
U.S. legislation in line with its WTO obligations. However, the EU felt
that the new regime would not be enough to comply with the DSB
56 id.
57 id.
58 SWAN & MuRPHYsupra note 1, at 673.
59 Mark Clough QC, Essay: The WTO Dispute Settlement System - A4
Practitioner Perspective, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 252, 266 (2000) [hereinafter
Clough].60 Report, supra note 54.
61 id.
62 id.
63 Warren, supra note 53, at 157.
64 Clough, supra note 59, at 265.65 Id.
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ruling.6 At the same time, the U.S. instituted its own dispute settlement
consultations against France, Netherlands, Greece, Ireland, Belgium, and
Spain as being inconsistent with the WTO subsidy rules.67 If the revised
version of the FSC is found to be incompatible with U.S. obligations
under WTO rules, the EU has asked the WTO to authorize retaliatory
sanctions. 8 If the WTO does authorize sanctions, it could be as high as
four billion dollars in retaliatory measures, which could be disastrous for
the U.S.
Looking forward, while the U.S. is attempting to implement
changes that will conform to WTO rules it is unlikely that the U.S. will
make fundamental changes in its tax laws. Diplomatic negotiations will
have to be the forum for settling this dispute; perhaps a multi-lateral
treaty dedicated to tax treatment will need to be considered in order to
balance the inequities caused by the variances in the U.S. and European
tax laws.
V. Hushkits and Agricultural Subsidies
Some of the problems associated with subsidies are not as clear
as the Banana, Airbus and FSC disputes. It is worth noting a few others
that, while not presently before the WTO's dispute mechanism, are
nonetheless problematic issues worth addressing.
Airplane Noise Restrictions and Hushkits
The current controversy over airplane noise restrictions is
attributable to the EU's adoption of regulations aimed at precluding
certain certified aircraft from serving community airports in an effort to
curb airplane noise.69
Unlike the U.S. where space is more readily available, many
European communities are closely situated to airports. The noise from
airplanes, according to the European studies can cause "mental disorders
and other detrimental psychological effects on human beings." 70 Many
critics feel that this regulation is "industrial protectionism masquerading
under the guise of environmentalism." 71 The U.S. takes the position that
the regulation adopted was politically motivated and the EU realized that
the high cost imposed on EU manufactures and airlines made it
impossible for the EU to adhere to the EU Commission's standard as
proposed.72
66 id.
67 Trade Report, supra note 29.
68 Clough, supra note 59, at 265.
69 Benedicte A. Claes, Aircraft Noise Regulation in the European Union: The
Hushkit Problem, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 329 (2000) [hereinafter Claes].
7 Id. at 337.
71 Troy A. Rolf, Comment: International Aircraft Noise Certification, 65 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 383, 385 (2000).72 Trade Report, supra note 29.
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The EU responded by developing this alternate legislation that
has since been adopted that the U.S. argues is incompatible with the
Chicago Convention and bilateral air services agreements to which the
EU and U.S. are parties.73 In addition, the U.S. claims that Airbus is
getting a boost over Boeing in aircraft sales because under the transfer
rule of the Regulation, EU carriers would have to buy second-hand
aircraft from other Member States instead of from non-European carriers.
Likewise, non-European carriers will refrain from buying older aircraft
from U.S. carriers if those aircraft can no longer be operated in the EU.74
The effect of the regulation has already cost American Business more
than $2.1 billion in spare parts and engine sales and the commercial
resale value of over 1600 U.S. aircraft have been reduced. 75
The U.S. is not opposed to reducing aircraft noise; in fact, the
opposite is true. The U.S. supports measures to reduce noise emissions,
what it opposes is the EU's unilateral adoption of this regulation. The
U.S. has stated it is willing to negotiate a resolution if the EU rescinds
the regulation. The future of this issue remains to be seen; as of now the
U.S. has filed with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
to develop a mutually agreeable standard that will reduce aircraft noise
level in a time frame that is suitable and practical. Recently the ICAO
agreed on a new noise certification standard which the U.S. supports.76
Subsidies in the Agricultural Industry
One of the more unique problems in the areas of subsidies is the
treatment of the agricultural industry. Agricultural subsidies account for
the vast bulk of the world trade in primary products.77 Part of the
problem lies in the fact that agricultural products are expressly excluded
from most of the coverage of the WTO Subsidies Agreement. 78 "The
exclusion of agriculture was necessitated by the advent of the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture that regulates national export subsides in a
fashion unsuited for treatment under the broader Subsidies Agreement." 79
Under the Agricultural Agreement, domestic agricultural
subsidies that conform to that Agreement are automatically treated as
"non-actionable" subsidies under the broader Subsidies Agreement." As
a result of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, reform programs are
currently being proposed by a number of nations to attempt to strike a




76 Trade Report, supra note 29.
77 SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 672.
7 8 Id. at 673.
79 id.
80 World Trade Agreement (1994), available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/wta.1994/iialal3.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
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balance between agricultural trade liberalization and governments' desire
to pursue legitimate agricultural policy goals.8
The United States has taken the position that in too many
countries the production and marketing decisions farmers make are
driven by government programs and as a result trade distorting policies
have developed skewing world markets.82 The U.S. is committed to
eliminating trade distorting measures but also supports policies that
address the non-trade concerns such as food security, resource
conservation, rural development and environmental protection.8" The
U.S. proposal that was submitted to the WTO recognizes the legitimate
role of government in agriculture but aims to reduce the agricultural
export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic subsidies. 84 At the
moment, WTO members are committed to reforming the problems
associated with agricultural subsides and 64% of the members have
submitted proposals for reforming the system.85 Negotiations are ongoing
and while there is no firm basis for a complaint yet, there is the hope that
the negotiations and the proposal submitted would yield an acceptable
solution to resolving this aspect of world trade.
VI. Conclusion
The problem of subsidies is not that they are wrong. Rather, the
root of the problem is that measures taken by different countries are
designed to enhance their own policies without running afoul of their
obligations to other states that are party to the various agreements. The
Banana regime, Airbus and FSC's are just some examples of the
utilization of the WTO to create bodies of law that attempt to answer the
bigger question. What practices are subsidies that run afoul of members'
obligations to other members and what practices are permitted?
There are currently more than 200 disputes pending before the
WTO, which is a sign that the system is working.86 The scheme of
settling disputes in the WTO encompasses five stages; only if
consultations fail does the panel review process begin.87 Diplomacy still
remains a vital element of settling disputes. The Banana dispute dates
back to 1993 and it was only as a result of the WTO's decision that the
EU agreed to implement an alternative scheme. The Airbus controversy
81 Staff at The World Trade Organization, The Agricultural Negotiations,
available at http://www.wto.org/english (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
82 Committee on Agriculture, Proposal for Comprehensive Long Term
Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission by the United States (June 23, 2000)
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/Itprop.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
83 id.
84 id.
85 See supra, note 81.
86 Clough, supra note 59, at 252.
87 Brimeyer, supra note 11, at 142-43.
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dates back to 1967 and the creation of the consortium. It is unlikely that
this dispute will be settled amicably through diplomatic channels and it
will be necessary for an impartial WTO panel to resolve this. There are
many tradeoffs to thrusting trade disputes into the legal realm but thus
far, it appears that the negative impacts have been diminished by the
accelerated pace at which the WTO is capable of resolving dispute.
Overall, the adoption of the WTO has had positive effects on
world trade. It is through this body that members can dialogue and
resolve their disputes. In the worst case, members can request a panel to
make a binding ruling that has the potential of sanctioning reciprocity,
equal to the amount that the member has been harmed as a means of
encouraging compliance with the panel decision. The old system of
unilateral decision making by one member when it deemed another
member was engaged in unfair practice is over. The new system of
engaging dialog and settling matters in legal forums is the prevailing
method in which countries need to work with each other to settle their
disputes.
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